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The study investigates the impact of the managerial overconfidence bias on the capital 
structure of a sample of 78 firms from Chile, Peru and Colombia, during the years 1996-
2014. We infer that there is a positive relation between the leverage ratio and a) the 
overconfidence; b) the experience and c) the male gender of the executive. 
Overconfidence is measured according to the status of the CEO (entrepreneur or not-
entrepreneur) and the hypotheses are tested through dynamic panel data model. The 
empirical results show a highly significant positive correlation between overconfidence 
and leverage ratio and between gender and leverage ratio while, in contrast, the relation 




















“The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, is 
an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages. Their absurd 
presumptions in their own good fortune, has been less taken notice of. It is, however, if 
possible, still more universal.” 
Adam Smith (1776) 
 
How do emotions influence the decision-making process? The majority of research in the 
corporate finance field is founded over the assumption that markets are efficient. It 
implies that managers and investors are selfish, rational, that they take decisions always 
based on an expected utility maximization criteria and that, when thinking on returns and 
risk, they only focus on mean and variance. However, these traditional assumptions are 
in contrast with what has been observed in reality. In fact, behavioural biases can produce 
irrational behaviour: according to the prospect theory, given a set of alternatives, people 
are taking decisions based on potential value of losses and profit rather than on the final 
outcome; they tend to avoid lower tail outcomes; and, finally, they take into consideration 
other people.  
Behavioural biases have an impact on the allocation of capital as well as on the 
redistribution of wealth. One of the biases whose effects are more visible is the 
overconfidence of CEOs, meaning the overestimation of the outcome of a situation. In 
particular, it can lead to undertake projects with negative NPVs, affecting the firm’s 
value. Consequently, in the presence of the bias, firms will prefer higher levels of leverage 




 The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of the CEOs overconfidence on the 
leverage ratio of Chilean, Peruvian and Colombian (founder members of MILA) firms, a 
sample that has not yet been explored by literature. Moreover, the impact of two other 
factors on the firm decision-making process is examined: the gender and the experience 
of the executive. In particular, we test three hypotheses: 1) the overconfidence bias has a 
positive impact on the leverage ratio of the firm; 2) more experienced CEOs are more 
likely to present the bias, leading to higher risk-taking behaviours; 3) the bias tends to 
affect male executives more than female ones. 
The work is organised as follows: Section 2 offers a brief literature review, Section 3 a 
detailed description of the sample and of the methodology, Section 4 is an explanation of 
the empirical model, Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 the conclusions of the 
study. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Definition of overconfidence 
The definition of overconfidence comes from psychology and consists in an individual’s 
overestimation of his personal abilities. Findings enhance that, when we invite people to 
rate their own skills regarding a specific activity, we can expect them to self-evaluate 
their performances as better than the average and than how they objectively are. Another 
manifestation of the bias is the belief that they can count on asymmetric information to 
forecast better the future and take decisions that are more successful. This leads people to 
undervalue risks and to develop the illusion of control, which is the credence that their 
influence on events is larger than it actually is [Langer, 1975].  
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From a statistical perspective, overconfidence is recognisable as an exaggeration of the 
mean resulting in a positive skewness of the probability distribution [Skala, 2008]. 
Moreover, the underestimation of risk involves an underestimation of the volatility [Ayres 
and Di Miceli, 2008].  
2.2 Consequences of CEO’s overconfidence 
Overconfidence produces various effects on CEOs’ choices and firms’ results. It leads to 
an overestimation of future positive cash flows and to an underestimation of the negative 
ones [Ahmed and Duellman, 2012] and, as Malmendier and Tate have enhanced, it 
provokes a higher reactivity of investment to cash flows. Overconfident directors are 
prone to undervalue costs and to assume a long term overlook, since they trust in the 
future developments of their business [Pirmoradi et al., 2013]. They perceive the risk of 
bankruptcy as less probable than what it really is, and that contributes to the decision of 
undertake higher levels of debt, compared to what it would be optimal and to what their 
non-overconfident peers do [Hackbarth and Dirk, 2009]. Moreover, the bias seems to be 
positively correlated to the emission of excessively promising earnings forecasts that then 
turn out to be missed, due to the overestimation of the managements’ own skills and to 
the underestimation of unexpected circumstances [Hribar and Yang, 2010].  
Executives affected by the bias believe that the stocks of their firms are underestimated 
by the market. As a consequence, when looking for means to finance new projects, they 
will prefer not to issue new equity. They will only lean on internal resources, whether is 
possible; otherwise they will appeal to debt securities [Malmendier and Tate]. This 




Optimist CEOs easily detect new opportunities [Solberg Nes and Segerstrom, 2006], with 
the risk of investing in more projects than what it would be advisable, and with an 
increased hazard of incurring into conflicting goals situations. They also seem to be more 
inclined to get involved in mergers and acquisitions operations, often investing in mergers 
that will produce negative cash flows and, besides, paying in excess for the target firm 
[Malmendier and Tate, 2007]. 
In summary, all the previous elements support the evidence that there is a negative 
correlation between the presence of the bias in the CEOs and the results of their firms 
[Hmieleski and Baron, 2009].  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 General approaches to overconfidence 
In literature, there are two distinct ways to investigate on behavioural corporate finance 
issues. The first is to consider that investors are acting irrationally while management is 
rational, and the second consists in adopting exactly the opposite scenario. Irrationality 
means, in both cases, that the actor exercises an impact on securities prices. When CEOs 
are irrational, their decisions are frequently far from being optimal but they firmly believe 
that all of their actions will comport a maximization of the utility [Baker et al, 2012]. 
In this paper, we focus on the manifestation of the bias in the management, assuming that 
investors are rational, even though, in reality, both biases could be present at the same 
time.  
3.2 How to measure overconfidence 
Overconfidence is not directly observable; therefore, we need to rely on variables that are 
correlated to it. Several examples are present in literature, among them: 
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a. “Relieved beliefs” argument.  The level of diversification of the portfolio is used 
as a measure of overconfidence. According to this approach, if CEOs are affected 
by the bias, then their personal portfolios will not be sufficiently diversified. That 
is a consequence of their excess of trust about the results of their own companies 
and about their own capacity to influence them in order to make profit. Moreover, 
overconfident CEOs will hold in-the-money options instead of exercising them 
and they will buy, while they should sell, company stocks [Malmendier and Tate, 
2005]. A drawback of this method is the difficulty of getting information about 
personal CEO’s portfolios.  
b. “Press-based” argument. Based on the image that the press shows of the CEO. 
This procedure calculates the level of overconfidence analysing the number of 
times particular key-words like “confident”/”confidence”, “optimist”/”optimism” 
(versus “conservative”, “reliable”, “cautious” and similar) appear on articles 
referring to a CEO in a defined time span [Malmendier and Tate, 2005]. This 
methodology is costly and difficult to implement. 
c. “Survey-based” argument. The chosen sample is asked to fill a psychological 
questionnaire whose score will give information about the degree of 
overconfidence. The most common example, in literature, is the Revised Life 
Orientation Test (LOT-R) [Scheier et al, 1994]. 
d. Evidence from research shows that the bias is present when the CEO is also the 
entrepreneur of the company: for instance, in the case of ventures, the majority of 
the entrepreneurs, when asked to rate the probability of their own business to 
succeed, replies with a number that is higher than the historical average. 
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Moreover, they declare that similar businesses have less chances to last in time 
than their own [Cooper et al, 1988]1.  
3.3 Overconfidence bias in CEOs 
The greater the experience of a person in a particular field, the greater his/her level of 
overconfidence, as proved through a study conducted by Lewis Goldberg, Senior 
Scientist at the Oregon Research Institute. He tested his hypothesis in a clinical 
environment, asking to experienced neurologists and to their administrative assistants to 
formulate diagnosis concerning the nature of brain damage’s cases. He observed that even 
though both categories had the same level of accuracy, neurologists showed a higher 
degree of confidence, due to the experience collected in the field. 
Analogously to the neurologists in Goldberg’s study, CEOs who are also entrepreneurs 
can be considered as being experienced in the business sector and result to be affected by 
the bias, as it has been investigated by several researchers. In particular, entrepreneurs 
have a deep belief that their achievements are a direct consequence of their actions, and 
they have a tendency to disregard the influence of external factors that are out of their 
control. Simultaneously, people with this mind-set are more likely to start new businesses 
[Evans and Leighton, 1989]. The launch of a new activity is indeed a situation 
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, an ideal environment for entrepreneurs 
who, in fact, think that the higher the risk the higher the potential gain [Palich and Bagby, 
1995].  
                                                     
1 Specifically, a venture has a probability of 50% to survive to its first eight years [Bygrave, 1997] and 
35% to reach year 10, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and to the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation.  However, most of the interviewed entrepreneurs declare that their own business 
has at least 70% of chances to survive and that a similar business owned by competitors would have 60% 
chances to last [Cooper et al, 1988].  
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Baron (2000) measured the optimism and overconfidence level in three groups of people: 
entrepreneurs, potential entrepreneurs and not entrepreneurs. His investigation revealed 
that entrepreneurs have the highest degree of the bias, together with potential 
entrepreneurs. In addition, other studies proved that entrepreneurs present the bias to a 
greater extent than professional managers [Busenitz and Barney, 1997].  
Regarding the gender, a recent finding is that the bias manifests significantly more in 
male executives than in female executives [Huang and Kisgen, 2012; Kuppuswamy and 
Mollick, 2015], according to the extensive literature in the psychological field that has 
tested how, in various contexts, males are more confident than females. 
3.4 Capital structure and firm’s value 
The value of a firm is strictly linked to the value of its shares, keeping in mind the 
exigence to make profit for the stakeholders. The conduct of the management, especially 
concerning capital structure and dividend policy, is the main driver of the prices of the 
stocks [Sinai and Rezaeian, 2005]; therefore, the presence of biases can generate 
important repercussions.  
Traditional corporate finance refers mainly to two theories in order to explain 
managements’ choices in terms of leverage: trade-off and pecking order theories. 
According to the trade-off theory, capital structure is the result of a compromise between 
costs and gains that the different financing options involve; especially, it is a trade-off 
between costs of financial distress and benefits of tax shield, it means between the 
advantages and disadvantages deriving from debt issuance. Therefore, the aim is to find 
an optimal debt ratio. Instead, the pecking order theory does not aim to the achievement 
of an optimal debt ratio. It is centred in the hypothesis that, when managers issue new 
9 
 
equity, investors think that the shares of the firm are overvalued and that managers are 
trying to get a profit out of it; therefore, they perceive the equity issuance as less valuable 
than it is. Given this evidence, managers will turn to equity only as a last resort while they 
will accord their preference to, in order, internal resources and debt.  
Both theories assume that all the actors involved are automatically taking rational 
decisions, ignoring the impact of behavioural biases and the importance of taking them 
into account when defining the drivers of capital structure.  
3.5 Data 
The study investigates the impact of CEOs overconfidence on firm’s value in three South 
American growing economies: Peru, Colombia and Chile. Peru has an average growth 
rate of around 7% per year, the second highest in Latin America and this leaded the 
country to be ranked as the one with the most optimistic business men by Grant Thornton 
International in 20122. According to the IMF, Chile is expected to have a growth of about 
3% in 2015, which will probably increase in 2016, and its executives are the third most 
optimistic in the world. Colombia will see as well a growth between 3.4% and 3.7% in 
the following two years. 
In order to investigate, data is gathered mainly through Economatica, a database that 
includes information about the capital markets of Latin America and United States. The 
study is focus on a sample of companies listed in the Bolsa de Valores de Lima (BVL), 
Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (BVC) and Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago (BCS) in the 
period going from the 1st of January 2006 until the 31st of December 2014. The three stock 
                                                     
2 The survey included 40 countries, 11.500 CEOs, and other senior executives among 10 industries and it 
assigns a number from 1 to 100. Peru got 78 points, followed by Brazil (74), Chile (52) and Mexico (50). 
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exchange markets are the founder members of the MILA, Mercado Integrado 
Latinoamericano. Data is collected quarterly on the months of March, June, September 
and December. 
We exclude from our sample banks, insurance, investment and intermediaries companies 
and we apply a minimum liquidity index requirement of 75%. The resulting sample 
includes seventy-eight firms operating in fifteen different industries3. The information 
related to the executives and the Chairmen of the companies (their age, gender, years of 
experience and whether they are founders or heirs of the business) have been extracted 
from the Quarterly and Annual Financial Reports of the firms.  
3.6 Variables  
3.6.1 Dependent variable 
The leverage ratio is the dependent variable chosen for the study. Its value depends on 
the components listed below.  
3.6.2 Independent variables 
According to the capital structure theories stated above, the most employed determinants 
of capital structure that, therefore, exercise an impact over the leverage ratio, are: size, 
profitability, tangibility, volatility, growth opportunities and non-debt tax shield. 
Traditional corporate finance models do not take into account the influence of behavioural 
corporate finance. We will include the overconfidence bias, which will be measured 
considering the status of the CEO in the company, i.e. if he is entrepreneur or not, namely, 
if he is also the owner of the business or not. According to the literature, the bias should 
                                                     
3 According to the classification of Economatica, which groups all the companies in the market into 
twenty sectors.  
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be present if the CEO is also an entrepreneur. Even if the CEO has in most cases the highest 
impact on decisions, it has been noticed that in several companies of the sample the Chairman 
of the Board of Directors is the founder, especially in the case of family controlled firms. In 
that scenario, the Chairman becomes the most influent figure in the firm. Therefore, likewise 
Ayres and Di Micaeli (2007)’s approach to the variable, we infer a presence of the bias if the 
CEO or the Chairman, or both, is a founder of the business or one of the heirs. An alternative 
proxy of the variable that will be used is the CEOs’ portfolio composition, in order to see 
how much they are investing in their own firms. In the presence of overconfidence, they tend 
to diversify less than what they rationally should and to include too many shares of their own 
companies.  Following the first methodology, the overconfidence bias will be measured by 
a dummy explanatory variable, which will assume value 1 if we are in the presence of the 
bias, otherwise 0. About the second proxy, we will follow the approach of Ayres and Di 
Miceli (2008) and consider there is overconfidence if the CEO holds, and maintains in 
time, the largest participation in the company. If that is the case, the binary variable will 
equal 1, otherwise its value will be 0. 
Regarding the other variables, the size has been proved to have a strong positive relation 
with our dependent variable (Frank and Goyal, 2007). This can be explained referring to 
the evidence that the risk of bankruptcy is higher for smaller companies, while it decreases 
for bigger firms. Therefore, the latter are more incline to issue debt than the former.  
The profitability is positively or negatively related to the leverage, depending on the 
theory we are following. According to the pecking order theory, if a firm is profitable 
then there are available internal resources, so the company will not issue new debt. On 
the other hand, for the trade-off theory, there is a positive relation between the two 
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variables. In fact, a high level of profitability reduces the risk of insolvency and increases 
the benefits of the tax-shield. 
If a company holds tangible assets, it can use them as a guarantee for a loan, decreasing 
the risk of insolvency. Therefore, the debt issuance is less risky for the company when 
assets are more tangible, which make us infer a positive correlation between the 
tangibility variable and the leverage ratio [Rajan and Zingales, 1995].  
The volatility of the firm’s cash flows is negatively related to the level of debt: the 
possibility of a drop in the earnings of the company makes the debt issuance riskier, 
because it increases the insolvency risk [Antoniou et al, 2008]. 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), elements like tax deductions for depreciation 
and investment tax credits can influence debts, being substitutes for the tax benefits of 
debt financing. Consequently, the non-debt tax shield presents a negative relation with 
the leverage. 
The growth opportunities, similarly to the profitability, can be negatively or positively 
related to the leverage. According to the pecking order theory, there is a positive relation 
because if a firm has many opportunities, it has higher chances of incurring in a shortage 
of all of its internal resources and, therefore, it will need to issue new debt to keep 
financing its projects [Fama and French, 2002]. For the trade-off theory, instead, there is 
a negative relation: growth opportunities increase the cost of financial distress, which 
implies a higher risk of insolvency. Therefore, firms are less incline to issue debt.  
3.7 Hypothesis  
3.7.1 Overconfidence and leverage ratio 
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Hypothesis 1: There is positive relation between overconfidence and leverage ratio of the 
firm. 
As it has been discussed in the above sections, especially in the paragraph 2.3, 
overconfidence leads to the underestimation of the risk and to the overinvestment, due to 
excessively positive forecasts of future cash flows. The new projects are preferably 
financed through internal resources, if available, otherwise through debt issuance. Equity 
is the last resource, due to the belief that the financial market is underestimating the stocks 
of the company. Therefore, in the presence of the bias the leverage ratio is expected to be 
higher than otherwise.  
3.7.2 Overconfidence and experience 
Hypothesis 2: There is positive relation between the years of experience of a CEO and 
the leverage ratio of the firm. 
As introduced in the paragraph 3.3, the degree of experience of a person has an impact 
on his/her perception of his/her ability to influence future results and will lead him or her 
to excessively trust in his/her own opinions and skills. In particular, the larger the 
experience, the higher the overconfidence bias. In the case of a CEO, a good measure is 
the years that (s)he has held in his/her executive position in the firm or the total year of 
experience collected in the firm. Moreover, experience generally increases with the age, 
so the level of overconfidence should be higher in older CEOs. Both the three proxies 
(years as a CEO, years in the company and age) will be used in the study. 
3.7.3 Overconfidence and gender 
Hypothesis 3: There is positive relation between the leverage ratio of the firm and the 
gender of the CEO or CFO when the CEO or CFO is a male. 
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The research in psychology illustrates that men are characterised by a higher confidence 
level than women. Even in a scholastic context, boys are more confident about their 
grades than girls [Jakobsson et al, 2013]. This evidence could even explain why women 
are less likely to start a business [Kuppuswamy and Mollick, 2015]. 
Huang and Kisgen (2012) apply the above findings to the business environment, proving 
that men issue more debt securities and do more acquisitions, while women are more 
reluctant when analysing the possibility of taking a new project. 
The choice of considering both CEOs and CFOs is due to two factors: the limited number 
of CEOs that are female in the sample, and the weight that CFOs have in the financial 
decisions of the firms. 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To analyse the linear relations between the leverage ratio and its components and, in 
particular, to test if the overconfidence bias is positively related to it, as we assume in 
Hypothesis 1, we run the following dynamic panel data model: 
 
(1) 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝑂𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑉𝑗,𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑂𝑗,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑗,𝑡 
 
Where j (j= 1, 2, 3, 4…, N) indicates the cross sections that are the companies of the 
sample, and t (t = 1, 2, 3, 4…, T) is the time-period that is the trimester of consideration.  
The variable 𝐿 is the leverage ratio, measured as net debt to equity; 𝑆 is the size of the 
firm, calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets; 𝑃 stands for the profitability, 
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given by the return on assets (ROA); 𝑇 indicates the tangibility, the ratio between tangible 
and total assets. The variable 𝑉 is the income volatility, calculated as the standard 
deviation of ROA; 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆 represents the non-debt tax shield that means depreciation to 
total assets; 𝐺𝑂 is the growth opportunities, given by the change in total assets.  
𝑂𝐶 is the overconfidence variable: it assumes values 1 if the Chief Executive Officer or 
the Chairman of the Board of Directors is (one of the) the founder(s) or a heir of the 
business, otherwise 0. We consider CEOs and Chairmen due to the elevate impact of both 
in the decision-taking process of the firms, as explained in paragraph 3.6.2.  𝑢𝑗𝑡 is a 
random disturbance term. 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we modify the model including a new discrete variable, 𝐸, 
that gives information about the experience of the current CEO of the company at the 
year t.  
 
(2) 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝑂𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑉𝑗,𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑂𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗,𝑡 
 
The variable 𝐸 indicates the experience of the CEO. In the study, we measure the 
experience in three alternative ways: a) the number of years during which the CEO has 
held his executive position; b) the number of years of the CEO in the company; c) the age 




Finally, we test Hypothesis 3 introducing the dummy variable Gender, which assumes 
value 1 if the CEO and/or the CFO are males, 0 otherwise. 
 
(3) 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝑂𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑉𝑗,𝑡 +




5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample presents a higher concentration of firms listed in the Bolsa de Comercio de 
Santiago (BCS), whose number is almost twice the one of the companies listed in the 
Bolsa de Valores de Lima (BVL) and more than four times the one of the firms listed in 
the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia (BVC). The BCS is, in fact, the third biggest stock 
exchange in Latin America, after Brazil and Mexico. Regarding the industries, the higher 
concentration is between the mining and the electric power sectors, which together 
include the 24% of the firms in the sample, while the lowest are textile, software and data, 
pulp and paper and chemical, which overall represent the 6%. Most of the CEOs and 
Chairmen in the sample are not founder or heir of the business, and the majority of 
CEOs/CFOs are male, even if it is more common for a woman to be a CFO than a CEO. 
The average chief executive officer is fifty-three years old, has been in the company for 
twelve years and has held his managerial position for seven years.  
The companies in the sample do not present, on average, an elevate debt to equity ratio, 
whose value is 42.8%, even though the variable is characterized by high volatility. 
17 
 
Around 44% of the sample firm’s assets are tangible, with a peak of above 90% and a 
minimum of almost 0. The companies are, overall, profitable even though the average 
return on assets corresponds to less than 2%. A complete summary of descriptive statistics 
is presented in Table 2.  
The descriptive statistics related exclusively to the group of firms affected by the 
overconfidence bias do not present any relevant difference, a part than the fact that 
overconfident CEOs tend to be relatively younger but with more experience than their not 
overconfident counterparts. In fact, their average age is of fifty years old, they have held 
their position for nine and a half years and they have been in the company for fourteen 
years.  
5.2 Empirical results and robustness check 
A first test of Hypothesis 1 is conducted using panel data fixed effect model: all the 
variables are significant at least at 10%, except from non-debt tax shield; the 
overconfidence is significant at 10% and presents a positive sign. However, a low value 
in the R-squared indicates that the model might not be the best fit, suggesting looking for 
a more suitable one.  
Following the approach of Ayres, Di Miceli (2008), we decide then to build a dynamic 
panel data model.  The choice to implement such a model derives mainly from the 
assumption that our response variable, the leverage ratio, depends on its past realisations 
and that our explanatory variables are not all strictly exogenous, meaning they present a 
correlation with past and possibly current realisations of the error. Moreover, our sample 
is characterized by: a) “small T, large N” panels; b) fixed individual effects; c) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across them. The 
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Arellano-Bond system generalized method of moments estimator is, therefore, identified 
as the most appropriate for the sample object of the study. Leverage ratio, tangibility, 
income volatility, non-debt tax shield, profitability, growth opportunities and size have 
been linearly transformed in order to avoid negative values and, then, their natural 
logarithm are used to run the regression. 
The results of the robust one-step regression are shown in Table 3. We define tangibility, 
income volatility and non-debt tax shield as predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
variables; profitability and growth opportunities as endogenous; and overconfidence and 
size as exogenous. All the variables appear to be significant at least at 5%: among them, 
the ones that show higher significance level are the first lag of the leverage ratio, the 
tangibility (with its first lag), the size, the profitability, the first two lags of the growth 
opportunities and, finally, the explanatory variable of higher interest for this study, the 
overconfidence.  All of their coefficients have the sign we suspected due to the review of 
the literature.  In particular, the coefficient related to overconfidence presents a positive 
sign, confirming the hypothesis that a growth in the variable corresponds to a higher 
leverage ratio. The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation is used to verify the validity 
of the model, proving the absence of serial second-order autocorrelation.  
To verify the robustness of the results, we split the overconfidence regressor into two 
variables: overconfidence of CEO, which assumes value 1 if the CEO is also an 
entrepreneur or heir of the business, and overconfidence of the Chairman, which assumes 
value 1 if the Chairman is also an entrepreneur or heir of the business. Running two 
different regressions, one including the former and the other including the latter, we find 
out that the overconfidence of the Chairman is characterised by higher significance level 
and is positively related to the leverage ratio, while the overconfidence of the CEO seems 
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to be negatively related to it and not significant. This evidence could suggest that the 
presence of the bias in the Chairman has a higher impact on the decision-making process 
of the firms in the sample than when the bias is present in the CEO. Results are visible in 
Table 3. 
In order to conduct further checks to the robustness of these results, we run the same 
regressions using an alternative measure of overconfidence: this time we consider the 
CEO/Chairman as overconfident if he/she holds the largest participation in the company, 
as explained in section 3.6.2. Results are similar to the ones shown in Table 3, confirming 
the significance of the overconfidence variable, as well as the other explanatory variables, 
in the model. The Arellano-Bond serial correlation test shows the validity of this 
alternative of the model. Similarly to the previous case, we split the overconfidence 
variable in overconfidence of the CEO and overconfidence of the Chairman, finding that 
only the latter is significant. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we run three identical versions of the model, using each time an 
alternative measure of the experience: a) years of experience as a CEO of the company, 
b) years of experience in the company, c) age of the CEO. All of them appear to be 
negatively related to the leverage ratio and the age of the CEO is more significant than 
the other two proxies, suggesting perhaps a bigger impact of the age than of the years of 
experience (Table 4). Also in this case, as well as for Hypothesis 1, we run again the 
model using the alternative measure of overconfidence, confirming the previous results. 
This evidence, in contrast with our hypothesis, can be explained thinking that CEOs tend 
to undertake higher levels of risk in the earlier stages of their life and career [Graham, 
Harvey and Puri, 2013], while they become more risk-averse with the age.  
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Finally, in order to test Hypothesis 3, we include the binary variable gender to the model, 
which assumes value 1 if the CEO and/or the CFO is a male, otherwise 0. The regression 
shows that the variable is highly significant and that it is positively correlated to the 
leverage ratio. This evidence supports our hypothesis, according to which male 
CEOs/CFOs are more likely to be overconfident than female CEOs/CFOs, implying a 
higher level of leverage ratio. Results are summarized in Table 4. Moreover, we split the 
variable gender into gender of the CEO and gender of the CFO, observing that only the 
latter is highly significant. As well as for the previous hypotheses, we confirm the validity 
of the results by using the alternative measure of overconfidence: also in this case results 
appear to be similar.  
Finally, the random-effects GLS regression is run, in order to compare its results with the 
ones obtained through the Arellano-Bond dynamic model. The main differences are the 
followings: the non-debt tax shield and the volatility become significant respectively at 
5% and 1% and the first two measures of experience (years as a CEO and years in the 
company) have a positive coefficient, while the age maintains a negative one. The 
overconfidence variable does not present any variation in its significance level and sign, 
confirming its robustness. OLS and fixed-effects regressions confirm, as well, the 
significance of the overconfidence variable, with little variations regarding the behaviour 
of the other regressors. In both cases, the variables related to the experience present the 
same signs of the random-effects regression: negative for the age, positive for the years 




The study investigates the impact of one of the behavioural biases, the managerial 
overconfidence, on the capital structure of a sample of Chilean, Peruvian and Colombian 
companies (founder members of MILA). While research is growing on this topic, this 
same sample has not been investigated before and, in general, the only similar work 
related to a South American country, specifically Brazil, is the one of Ayres and Di Miceli 
(2008).  
Three hypotheses are formulated: 1) and 2) the overconfidence of the CEO and his/her 
experience are positively correlated to the leverage ratio and 3) male executives tend to 
present the bias more than their female counterparts. Findings confirm the first and the 
third hypotheses: the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data model and the robustness checks 
show the highly significance of the overconfidence bias and its positive impact on the 
leverage ratio, as well as for the gender. Moreover, the bias seems to have a higher 
significance when it is present in the Chairman than in the CEO. These results suggest 
not only that overconfidence can be one of the explanations for situations in which 
managers are not taking optimal decisions, but also that the gender might have an 
influence: male executives tend to undertake more risks and to prefer a higher leverage 
ratio than female ones. However, the limited number of female executives that are present 
in the sample does not allow the formulation of absolutely reliable conclusions about the 
impact of the gender on corporate decisions.  
Regarding the second hypothesis, one of the main innovations of the study is that it offers 
three measures of the experience: the number of years of the CEO holding his/her 
position, the years he/she has been working for the company and his/her age. They appear 
to be, contrary to our expectations, negatively related to the leverage ratio, evidence that 
can be justified by the section of literature which proves that people become gradually 
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more risk averse in later stages of their lives. However, since the study reveals the high 
influence of the Chairman in the decision-making process of South-American firms, it 
would be interesting, in further studies, to analyse how his/her experience affects the 
leverage ratio. 
Finally, to reply to the question stated in the introduction, the study supports the evidence 
that emotions, specifically overconfidence, influence corporate decisions, leading the 
management to make choices that can be very far from optimal. 
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Table 1: Definition and predicted signs of the main variables  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
VARIABLES Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min. Max Obs. 
LEVRATIO 0.428 0.564 -2.00 4.07 1,776 
PROF 0.0156 0.0307 -0.207 0.247 2,082 
SIZE 13.99 1.554 8.568 18.10 2,605 
GROWTHOPP 0.0308 0.106 -0.953 1.144 2,540 
TANG 0.441 0.235 0.00122 0.902 1,860 
NDTS 2.130 1.728 -2.303 9.586 1,183 
VOL 0.0142 0.0245 7.34e-05 0.314 2,072 
EXPASCEO 7.036 7.074 0 47 2,691 
EXPINCOMPANY 12.30 9.837 0 47 2,444 
EXPAGE 53.05 7.792 34 76 1,160 
 
LEVRATIO is the leverage ratio of the company, PROF is its profitability, SIZE its size, GROWTHOPP its growth opportunities, TANG its 
tangibility, NDTS its non-debt tax shield, VOL its volatility, EXPASCEO the years of experience of the CEO in his current executive position, 
EXPINCOMPANY his/her years of experience in the company, EXPAGE his/her age. Explanations about how the variables have been 




Variable Name Measure 
Predicted 
Sign 
L Leverage Ratio NetDebt/Equity   
P Profitability 





of Total Assets 
+ 
GO Growth Opp. 
















Deviation of ROA 
- 
OC Overconfidence Binary variable + 
E Experience 
Years as CEO of 
the firm 
+ 
E Experience Years in the firm + 
E Experience Age + 
Gender Gender: female Binary variable - 
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator - Hypothesis (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
L.lnLEVRATIO 0.503*** 0.503*** 0.502*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
L2.lnLEVRATIO 0.0312 0.0312 0.0341 
 (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0458) 
L3.lnLEVRATIO 0.0740** 0.0740** 0.0746** 
 (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
L4.lnLEVRATIO 0.0379 0.0379 0.0335 
 (0.0658) (0.0658) (0.0647) 
L5.lnLEVRATIO -0.111 -0.111 -0.109 
 (0.0804) (0.0804) (0.0801) 
lnTANG 0.0521*** 0.0521*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
L.lnTANG -0.0253** -0.0253** -0.0219* 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0121) 
lnVOL -0.00447 -0.00447 -0.00440 
 (0.00316) (0.00316) (0.00317) 
lnNDTS -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0204 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0172) 
L.lnNDTS -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0167 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0220) 
L2.lnNDTS -0.0376 -0.0376 -0.0394* 
 (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0226) 
lnPROF -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0451) 
L.lnPROF -0.0226 -0.0226 -0.0232 
 (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0368) 
lnGROWTHOPP -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0137 
 (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0289) 
L.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0610*** -0.0610*** -0.0556** 
 (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0222) 
L2.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0770*** -0.0770*** -0.0743*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0263) 
L3.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0729* -0.0729* -0.0713* 
 (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0411) 
lnSIZE 1.346*** 1.346*** 1.323*** 
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.359) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 0.0174**   
 (0.00845)   
OVERCONFIDENCE_CHAIRMAN  0.0174**  
  (0.00845)  
OVERCONFIDENCE_CEO   -0.000519 
   (0.00197) 
    
Observations 464 464 464 
Number of COMPANY 56 56 56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model (1), (2) and (3) are the outputs of Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator where: lnLEVRATIO is the log of the leverage 
ratio; lnTANG the log of the tangibility; lnVOL the log of the income volatility; lnNDTS the log of the non-debt tax shield; lnPROF 
the log of the profitability; lnGROWTHOPP the log of the growth opportunities; lnSIZE the log of the size. L. indicates the first lag 
of the variable, L2 the second and so on. In Model (1) we use, as a measure of overconfidence, OVERCONFIDENCE, which is 
measured as the status (entrepreneur or not-entrepreneur) of the CEO and of the Chairman of the company: if one or both of them 
are the founder or a heir of the business, the binary variable assumes value 1, otherwise 0. In Model (2) we consider, as a measure 





Table 4: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator - Hypothesis (2) and (3) 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
L.lnLEVRATIO 0.536*** 0.463*** 0.597*** 0.503*** 
 (0.133) (0.142) (0.127) (0.125) 
L2.lnLEVRATIO 0.00541 0.00728 -0.0170 0.0312 
 (0.0500) (0.0472) (0.101) (0.0466) 
L3.lnLEVRATIO 0.0816*** 0.0837*** 0.0546*** 0.0741** 
 (0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0198) (0.0292) 
L4.lnLEVRATIO 0.0353 0.0413 0.0567 0.0382 
 (0.0694) (0.0583) (0.0380) (0.0658) 
L5.lnLEVRATIO -0.115 -0.0513 -0.0327 -0.111 
 (0.0827) (0.0831) (0.104) (0.0803) 
lnTANG 0.0538*** 0.0560*** 0.0657*** 0.0522*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.00926) (0.0129) 
L.lnTANG -0.0287** -0.0279** -0.0475*** -0.0255** 
 (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0153) (0.0117) 
lnVOL -0.00548* -0.00482 -0.00367 -0.00470 
 (0.00326) (0.00364) (0.00300) (0.00319) 
lnNDTS -0.0217 -0.0212 -0.0556*** -0.0227 
 (0.0150) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0153) 
L.lnNDTS -0.0138 -0.0124 -0.0341* -0.0122 
 (0.0221) (0.0256) (0.0176) (0.0222) 
L2.lnNDTS -0.0371* -0.0208 -0.0333** -0.0377 
 (0.0225) (0.0261) (0.0149) (0.0229) 
lnPROF -0.122*** -0.117** -0.0994* -0.118*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0455) (0.0553) (0.0447) 
L.lnPROF -0.0103 -0.0169 -0.0338 -0.0223 
 (0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0530) (0.0367) 
lnGROWTHOPP -0.0235 -0.0296 -0.0836* -0.0145 
 (0.0275) (0.0304) (0.0430) (0.0281) 
L.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0522** -0.0550* -0.0236 -0.0607*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0284) (0.0334) (0.0226) 
L2.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0782*** -0.0770*** -0.142*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0266) (0.0387) (0.0257) 
L3.lnGROWTHOPP -0.0719* -0.0593 -0.0157 -0.0729* 
 (0.0417) (0.0466) (0.0382) (0.0410) 
OVERCONFIDENCE 0.0167** 0.0187** 0.0821*** 0.0175** 
 (0.00831) (0.00846) (0.0317) (0.00845) 
lnSIZE 1.318*** 1.238*** 0.680 1.348*** 
 (0.377) (0.427) (0.535) (0.353) 
EXPASCEO -0.00108*    
 (0.000958)    
EXPINCOMPANY  -0.000715*   
  (0.000629)   
EXPAGE   -0.000416**  
   (0.000391)  
GENDER    0.00156*** 
    (0.00934) 
     
Observations 448 400 214 464 
Number of COMPANY 54 49 24 56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model (4), (5), (6) and (7) are versions of Model (1) integrated with the following variables: EXPASCEO (Model (4)), which is the number 
of years of the executive as a CEO of the company, EXINCOMPANY (Model (5)), the number of years of the executive working in the 
company, EXPAGE (Model (6)), the age of the CEO. GENDER (Model (7)) is a binary variable that assumes value 1 if the CEO and/or the 
CFO is a male, otherwise 0. An explanation of the other variables can be found in Table 3. 
